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I. INTRODUCTION

I maintain that as the children of America watch family violence occur in their own home, when they watch people who
supposedly love each other be brutal to each other, they are
going to accept it as a way of life and I think that's one of
the reasons that youth violence2 is probably the greatest
crime problem in America today.
Despite ones political point of view, the preceding quote from Janet
Reno describes one of the greatest problems facing our society today. Domestic violence is a reality that until recently was hardly ever discussed because of the "private" nature of the facts and circumstances. The prevailing
view is that what happens within ones own home is "private" and none of
anyone else's business. The reality, however, is that domestic violence is
more prevalent than most want to admit, and the costs to society and the
victims are great. Civil protection orders are just one way to protect victims
of domestic violence. The question is: Do protection orders really protect
victims? If not, why not? The effectiveness of protection orders in Wyoming and around the country have been called into question by proponents
and critics alike - on one hand because of their enforcement, or lack thereof,
and on another because of the way they are issued, or are not issued
Specifically in Wyoming, questions have been raised as to whether a
"finding" of domestic violence must be made by a court before a domestic
violence protection order ("DVPO") can be issued. Additionally, questions
about whether a respondent can "stipulate" to a DVPO without the court
making any kind of a finding have also been raised." Although seemingly
separate issues, they are closely related. As will be discussed in detail below, the effectiveness of protection orders is directly related to how the court
interacts with victims of domestic violence as part of the "coordinated efforts approach. 'S The coordinated efforts approach is thwarted when a court
allows a respondent to "stipulate" to a DVPO without any kind of finding of

2.

Address of Att'y Gen Janet Reno (March 23-25, 1993), cited in CouRTS AND
51 (National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges ed., 1993).
3.
See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
4.
See infra note 159.
5.
See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
CoMMuNrrEs: CoNFRoNTiNG VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY
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domestic violence by the court.6 Furthermore, allowing a respondent to
"stipulate" to a DVPO without the court making a finding is contrary to the
clear language of the statute, and the intent of the legislature. 7
The issuance of DVPOs are becoming more common.' The new
laws in Wyoming have begun to make the process of obtaining a protection
order in Wyoming more 'user friendly,' such that those who are in need can
obtain a DVPO without an attorney.9 One change making the process easier
is Wyoming's adoption of the use of standardized forms. The current standardized form used in Wyoming has been revised over the years, the current
form being better than any of the previous.'0
Protection orders and courts play an important role in the battle
against domestic violence. Protection orders have been shown to at least
deter batterers from committing future acts of violence." Studies have
shown that court policies and practices could actually discourage a woman's
effort to obtain a protection order. 2 This article will focus on the effectiveness of the current Wyoming protection order statute, and make recommendations on how the statute needs to be improved in relation to the coordinated efforts approach.
A.

Shedding Myths About Domestic Violence

Ending an abusive relationship is not a one-time occurrence where a
victim leaves and the abuse is over; leaving is a process that occurs over
time.13 For many people who have not experienced the effects of domestic
violence this is a difficult concept to understand. The typical response is:
"Why doesn't she just leave him?" This question is more difficult to under-

6.

Id.

7.

See infra notes 160-85 and accompanying text.

8.
See Catherine Klein & Lelsye Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFsTRA L. REv. 801,810 (1993).

9. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-101 et seq. (LexisNexis 2001). Victims of domestic violence in Wyoming are able to obtain protection orders on their own. Wyoming Courts now
have standardized forms that victims can use to obtain a DVPO without an attorney. However, an important factor in obtaining an effective order of protection is the victim's access to
legal representation. See infra notes 243-249 and accompanying text.
10.
The previous form stated: "The respondent has stipulated that the court may exercise
jurisdiction over him under the Domestic Violence Protection Act, but does not stipulate that
he or she has committed an act of domestic violence against the Petitioner." The new form
states: "The parties stipulate that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over them under the
Domestic Violence Protection Act even though the Respondent may dispute that he or she has
committed an act of domestic violence against the Petitioner."
11.
See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
12.
See Michelle Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with
Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEo. PUBuC POL'Y REv. 51,56 (2000).
13.
Id.
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stand than it is to answer. Domestic violence is a pattern of behavior. 4 Batterers use tactics of control, often referred to as the "wheel of power and
control," to exert control over their victims.' s These tactics include: Emotional abuse, sexual abuse, isolation, minimizing and denying the abuse,
blaming the victim, using children, using male privilege and economic control (i.e. the abuser is the "breadwinner" and thus has control over the
money), coercion and threats, and intimidation. 6
For example, a victim of domestic violence may be in a relationship
where there are children involved. A batterer will often use children as a
means of leverage over the victim. A batterer will threaten a victim that if
she leaves, she will never see the children again. A victim may also be in a
difficult economic situation, one where the batterer controls the money or
the victim is not allowed to work; thus, there is no financial means to escape.
Domestic violence is never an isolated or individual event, but a pattern of
conduct that builds on previous events; the previous events having a profound effect on the victim. 7 One should never judge a victim of domestic
violence thinking that they could, or should, leave at any time. The situation
is usually more complex than someone on the outside can understand.
The lethality of domestic violence also increases when the batterer
believes the victim is either leaving or has left." Abuse worsens even when
a victim expresses a desire to leave, thereby serving as a warning and deterrent. Therefore, any contact that anyone, courts, attorneys, advocates, and
judges, have with victims of domestic violence is critical because it is may
be at a time when the victim is trying to leave, or is at least reaching out for
help. This will always be true when a victim seeks an order of protection. A
victim of domestic violence needs support, not judgment.
Domestic violence is usually a learned behavior.
Nevertheless,
domestic violence is not only learned from one's own family, but also
learned from society. Those who care can make a difference, perhaps not
with the current abuser, but at least with generations to come.2" Domestic
violence is not caused by alcohol, drugs, "out of control behavior," stress, or
problems that are "inherent" in every relationship.2 Batterers can be found
in every age, racial, socioeconomic, educational, occupational, and religious

14.
See JANET CARTER ET AL, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASES: A NATIONAL
MODEL FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATION 22-24 (Jacqueline Agtuca et al. eds. 1992).
15.
See LIsAE JORDAN ET AL., THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL LAW MANUAL:
PROTECION ORDERS AND FAm'Ly LAW CASES

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

2 (2001).

Id. at2-6.
See CARTER, supra note 14, at 23.

Id. at25.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 32-34.
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group." Thus, doctors, lawyers, and even judges could be batterers; however, the majority of batterers are male, and the majority of all victims are
female.' It is important for everyone to realize that there is no "typical"
batterer so as not to stereotype and miss the signs of domestic violence.
B.

DisturbingStatistics

Women suffer domestic violence in "greatly disproportionate numThree to four million women are victims of domestic violence perpetrated by a husband or partner.25 Women are subject to a one-in-four to a
one-in-three chance they will become a victim of domestic violence at the
hands of a partner during their lifetime.26 Eighty-five percent of violent
crimes committed by partners (boyfriends, spouses, or significant others) are
perpetrated against women.2 ' Domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in America. 21 One-third of women seeking treatment from
hospitals do so because of domestic violence.29 One-third of all homicides
of women are committed by husbands or bcyfriends.30
bers." '

Sixty-three percent of males in prison between the ages of eleven
and twenty are in prison because they killed their mother's batterer. 3' These
young boys also have higher rates of suicide, violent assaults, sexual assaults, and alcohol and drug abuse. a2 Annual medical expenses stemming
from domestic violence run between three to five billion dollars per year, of
which the taxpayers absorb the majority.3" During the Vietnam War, the
United States lost 39,000 soldiers; during the same time period (1967-1973),
17,500 women and children were killed by members of their own families. 3'
For children, often referred to as the "silent victims," domestic violence has a devastating effect. Children who witness domestic violence are
likely to suffer from emotional and developmental problems after either
hearing or seeing the abuse.35 Children may also inadvertently become vic-

22.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 41 (95% of victims are women).
23.
Melissa Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges Facing Tribal Governments
24.
in Implementing the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts, 90
KY. L.J. 123, 126 (2002).
See JORDAN, supra note 15, at 1.
25.
26.
Id.
See Tatum, supra note 24, at 126.
27.
Id. at 126-27.
28.
Id. at 127.
29.
Id.
30.
31.

Id. at 127-28.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 128.
Id.
Klein & Orloff, supra note 8, at 809.
See JORDAN, supra note 15, at 10.
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tims when they get in the way. 6 Males who are over the age of 15 often try
to intervene and may be hurt, or may hurt someone else." Children who
have experienced domestic violence often have problems knowing who they
can trust, which often leads to these same children becoming victims to sexual and/or physical abuse later as adults."a Children who are exposed to domestic violence are more likely to become involved in the criminal justice
system, whether for violent crimes, sexual crimes, or for drugs and alcohol.3 "
Perhaps the most important statistic for our purposes, however, is
that studies have proven that men who batter their partners are likely to batter their children as well.' These children, especially male children who are
exposed to domestic violence, are likely to become batterers themselves. 4'
Children are indeed victims when it comes to domestic violence, and they do
not have to suffer actual physical abuse to be a victim.
C. Statistics on ProtectionOrders
An effective approach to protecting victims of domestic violence is
essential because sixty percent of women in one study reported that the
court's protection order was violated, and of those violations, twenty-nine
percent of the violations resulted in severe violence.4 2 Women who seek
protective orders have typically endured abuse over a prolonged period of
time.43 One-fourth of victims that responded to one survey indicated they
had endured abuse for over 5 years." Most petitioners asking the court for a
protective order have suffered physical abuse, and over half of those have
endured "severe abuse."' 5 The longer the women experienced domestic violence, the more severe the violence became.'
Some research has indicated that the issuance of protective orders
does not reduce the likelihood of future violence.47 The outcome, however,
seems to be dependant upon how the batterer is treated by the courts. 4s Research indicates that vigorous prosecution and significant sanctioning of
36.

Id.

37.
38.

Id.; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See JORDAN, supra note 15, at 10-11.

39.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11; see also infra note 77.
41.
JORDAN, supra note 15, at 10-11.
42. See Andrew Klein, Re-abuse in a Population of Court-RestrainedMale Batterers:
Why RestrainingOrdersDon't Work, in ADELE HARRELL & BARBARA SMITH, DoARREsAND
RESTRAiNiNG ORDERS WoRK? (Eve Buzawa & Carl Buzawa eds., Sage Publications, 1996).
43.
See Waul, supra note 12, at 57.
44.
Id.

40.

45.
SUSAN KEILITZ ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDERS: THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1997).

46.

See id.

47.

Waul, supra note 12 at 54.

48.

Id.
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abusers prevents re-abuse.4 ' Another reason victims seek protective orders
from the court is to document and create a record of the abuse they have
experienced."0 This may be a way to "break the silence," sending the abuser
a message that she is not going to tolerate the abuse anymore, a way of regaining control, or perhaps creating a record in case something worse happens.5 Therefore, the effectiveness of protective orders may not only depend on whether the violence immediately decreases, but also on whether
the DVPO is actually issued to help create the record or establish the independence of the victim.
More than half of women seeking protective orders do so because
some type of physical injury was inflicted upon them during the last "incident." 2 While respondents usually violate a protection order in some way,
the protection order does generally deter the respondent from committing
repeated incidents of abuse.53 Therefore, the batterer may violate the order,
such as contacting the victim by phone, but the chances of physical abuse
decrease after the order is issued.
Many women believe that a protective order is effective to document
abuse, but less than half believe the batterer had to obey the order.54 For
courts, a batterer's prior abuse history is a "significant predictor" of whether
abuse may continue after the issuance of a protective order.5 Additionally,
sixty-five to eighty-five percent of respondents in protection order proceedings have prior criminal arrest histories.5 6 Prior criminal history is relevant
and should be considered. Moreover, the probability of continued abuse is
increased when a male strongly resists the order, the batterer and victim live
separately when the order is sought, and the woman has children." These
are all important factors for courts, attorneys, and advocates to consider
when issuing or seeking a DVPO.
IU. PROTECTION ORDERS - A COORDINATED EFFORTS APPROACH

A coordinated efforts approach, coordinating the combined efforts
of police, prosecution, and community service providers, increases the successful protection of victims of domestic violence." "[T]he most effective
response [to domestic violence] is created when all parts of the justice system coordinate their operations and function in a collaborative effort to ad49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Klein, supra note 42.
Waul, supranote 12, at 56.
Id.
See Klein, supra note 42.
See KEnxrz, supra note 45.
See Klein, supra note 42.
See Waul, supra note 12, at 54.
Id.
See Klein, supra note 42.
See Waul, supra note 12, at 58.
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dress the problem."5 9 Victims who are supported in their efforts to obtain a
protection order and to end the abuse in their lives are much more likely to
take other steps to keep themselves safe.' The protection order process is a
"prime opportunity" for providing the necessary support and encouragement
to keep victims of domestic violence safe.6
Courts are on the front lines during the protection order process.
"How effectively the judiciary handles domestic violence cases ultimately
determines how effectively the justice system is able to break the cycle of
violence. It is a judge who sets the tone in the courtroom, and it is the judge
who makes the most critical decisions affecting the lives of the victim, the
perpetrator, and children." 2 There are nine core values that courts dealing
with cases involving domestic violence should strive to uphold, the first of
which is victim and child safety. The courts accomplish victim and child
safety through the fifth value, coordination of procedures and services.63
Courts can coordinate with "community partners" to ensure those who are
seeking help actually receive the help they seek.
"Community partners" are those resources within the community
that have abilities to provide services for victims of domestic violence.
These community partners include representatives from the court system,
law enforcement, and victim advocates such as Project SAFE and the Coalition Against Domestic Violence. An effective "community partner" approach may involve formal and informal meetings where the discussion focuses on how these partners can work together to provide coordinated services for victims." The most important thing to remember is that without a
"coordinated efforts" approach, a victim of domestic violence may not get
the help needed to break free from a batterer's power and control.65
El. WYOMING'S PROTECTION ORDER STATUTE

Wyoming's Protection Order statute is found in title 35, chapter 21,
of the Wyoming statutes.' It is referred to as the "Domestic Violence Pro59.
See EMILY SACK, CREATING A DoMESTic VIOLENCE
eds. 2002).
60.
See Waul supra note 12, at 57.
61.
Id.
62.
See CARTER, supra note 14, at xvii.
63.
See SACK, supra note 59, at 5-6.

64.

COURT I

(Lindsey Anderson et al.

Id. at lO.

65.
For instance, a victim coming to a court to obtain a protection order may need shelter,
food, or other necessities because the batterer has control of the money. She may be too
frightened to stay at her own home, even if the courts award her possession of the residence,
because the batterer will still physically abuse her, or worse, kill her. She may need legal
representation, or any number of things. If a court and its personnel has a list of these resources, and is trained to identify the need, the victim is much more likely to remain safe and
gain the control needed to either leave the relationship or take steps to protect herself.
66.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-101 et seq. (LexisNexis 2003).
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tection Act." 7 This Act allows a victim of "domestic abuse" to obtain an
order from the Circuit Court, or the District Court if the County has no Circuit Court, which orders the batterer or abuser to "refrain from abusing the
petitioner or any other household member."68 Domestic abuse is defined as
"physical abuse, threats of physical abuse or acts which unreasonably restrain the personal liberty of any household member by any other household
'
member."69
A "household member" includes: 1) persons married to each
other; 2) persons living with each other as if married; 3) persons formerly
married; 4) persons formerly living together as if married; 5) parents and
their adult children; 6) adults sharing common living quarters; 7) persons
who are the parent of a child, but who are not living together; and 8) persons
who are in, or have been in, a dating relationship.7"
One interesting aspect of the statute's definition of a "household
member" is that children are not included anywhere in the definition.7' The
statute defines adult as "a person who is sixteen (16) years of age or older, or
legally married."72 The result is that children under the age of sixteen who
are unmarried are left unprotected by this statute.7 3 At least thirty-six states
and the District of Columbia issue DVPOs to children.74 Wyoming does
allow a petitioner to ask the court for "temporary custody" of any minor
67.

WYo. STAT. ANN.

§ 35-21-101 (LexisNexis 2003).

§ 35-21-105(a) (LexisNexis 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21102(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003) (defining court as the Circuit Court, unless the County does not
have a Circuit Court, in which case the District Court is the court ofjurisdiction).
69.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003).
70.
WYO.STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a)(iv)(A)-(H) (LexisNexis 2003).
71.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text. It appears that the Wyoming legislature
has purposely excluded minors when examining such included definitions as "parents and
their adult children." WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a)(iv)(E) (LexisNexis 2003). This has
been the case since the statute was adopted in 1982. See Session Laws of Wyoming, ch. 45
(defining "household member" as: "[S]pouses, person living together as spouses, former
spouses, parents, adult children and other adults sharing a common household").
72.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003).
73.
1d.
74.
ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (2002); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3601 (2003); ARK.CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2002); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (2003);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-101 (2003) (defining domestic abuse as that on any relation);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-103 (2003) (restraining abuse of children); CONN. GEN STAT.
ANN. § 46b-38a (2003); 13 DEL. CODE ANN. § 701A et. seq. (2003) ("Child Protection From
Domestic Violence Act"); D.C. CODE § 16-1004 (2003); GA. CODE § 19-13-1 (2002); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (2003); 750 ILL. COM. STAT. 60/103
(2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 (2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (2002); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19, § 4002 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 4-501 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2003);
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-21-3 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-903 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. §
33.018 (2003); N.M. STAT. § 40-13-2 (2003); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 822 (2003); N.D. CODE §
14-07.1-01 (2003); OIo CODE § 3113.31 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 60.1 (2003); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2003); S.C. CODE § 204-20 (2002); S.D. LAWS § 25-10-1 (2003); TEX.
FAM CODE § 71.003 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.50.010 (2003); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-204 (2003); Wis. STAT. § 813.122 (2002).
68.

WYO. STAT. ANN.
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children, but also allows the court to give the respondent visitation "if adequate provision can be made for the safety of the children . . . ." " The
Wyoming Child Custody statutes state, "The court shall consider evidence
of spousal abuse or child abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the
'
children."76
Nevertheless, some judges and attorneys do not seem to feel
that spousal abuse has anything to do with child custody; thus, batterers who
abuse their victims will often get equal custody even though there is ample
evidence to show that those who abuse "adults" are just as likely to abuse
their children."
The process of obtaining an order of protection is fairly easy and
straightforward. Wyoming, like most states, allows victims of domestic
violence to file a petition with the Circuit Court, or District Court if there is
no Circuit Court in the County, for an order of protection without charging a
fee.7" The application must be accompanied by a sworn affidavit setting
forth specific facts alleging domestic abuse.79 This is all done simply by
obtaining the standard petition packet from the court and following the instructions."0 If it appears from the facts alleged in the sworn application for
the order of protection that there exists a danger of further abuse, the court
shall immediately grant the petition for an ex parte temporary restraining
order."' The court then sets a hearing for seventy-two (72) hours from the
date the ex parte order was granted, or "as soon thereafter as the petition

75.

WYO.

STAT. ANN.

§ 35-21-105(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2003).

76.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(c) (LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added).
77.
See infra Section "III(D)" (relating a real life experience in which the GAL and Judge
had this-point of view); see also Lynne R. Kurtz, ProtectingNew York's Children: An Argument for the Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1345, 1352 n.52 (1997) (explaining that spousal abusers are
more likely to abuse their children as well and violence actually increases after divorce) (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME 59, 63 (1984) (finding that 53%
of men studied who abuse their wives also abuse their children and suggesting that the child
abuse is more likely to occur as the children grow older)); LEE H. BOWKER ET AL., ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WIFE BEATING AND CHILD ABUSE, IN FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
WIFE ABUSE 158, 162 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988) (finding that 70% of the
men studied who abused their wives also abused their children); Mary McKeman McKay,
The Link between Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Assessment and Treatment Considerations, 73 CHILD WELFARE 29 (1994) (indicating "child abuse is 15 times more likely to
occur in families where domestic violence is present"); Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcrafi,
Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspective on Child Abuse, 18 INT'L J. HEALTH
SERvs. 97, 106 (1988) (noting that half of the men studied abused both their wives and children); Stephen E. Doyne et al., Custody Disputes Involving Domestic Violence: Making
Children's Needs a Priority, 50 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1999).
78.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-103(a), (d) (LexisNexis 2003).
79.
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-103(b) (LexisNexis 2003).
80.
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-103(e) (LexisNexis 2003) (requiring the court to make
standard forms available to petitioners).
81.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-104(a) (LexisNexis 2003).
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may be heard by the court," 2 and causes the notice of the hearing, along
with the temporary order of protection, to be served upon the respondent."3
The court then holds a hearing to determine whether an order of protection should be awarded to the petitioner." The statute specifically states,
"Upon finding that an act of domestic abuse has occurred, the court shall
enter an order of protection ordering the respondent household member to
refrain from abusing the petitioner or any other household member. The
order shall specifically describe the behavior that the court has ordered the
respondent to do or refrain from doing." 5 Some powers the court has include: 1) grant sole possession of the residence to the petitioner; 2) give the
petitioner custody of any children, and order the respondent not to abduct or
remove any of the children from the jurisdiction; 3) arrange visitation for the
respondent of any children; 4) order counseling; 5) order child support; 6)
order support for the petitioner; 7) prohibit the respondent from selling or
disposing of property; and 8) order other relief as the court deems necessary
for the protection of the petitioner, children, or other household members.8 6
The order of protection is good for up to three (3) months, but can be extended for "good cause."87
A.

Needed Changes in Wyoming

There are at least four (4) changes or additions that need to be made
in the Wyoming protection order statute to make it more effective in protecting victims of domestic violence. First, the duration of an ex parte protective order needs to be more clearly defined. Previously, Wyoming's statute
had the shortest duration for an ex-parte order of protection in the country,
only seventy-two (72) hours, but now does not limit its duration. Second,
the amount of time for which a protection order remains in effect must be
increased. Third, the statute must be changed to adequately address the child
custody, visitation, and support issues that arise in DVPO proceedings.
Fourth, the statute must address child custody in the protection order statute
when there is already a child custody order or agreement in effect. Additionally, there are changes that need to be made at the trial court level, the
law enforcement level, and at the practitioner level, to create an effective
"coordinated efforts" approach; thus, making domestic violence victim assistance as effective as possible.
82.
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-104(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003). This section was amended
by H.R. 0133, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2003), Enrolled Act No. 93, 2003, ch. 173 § 1,
2003 Wyo. Session Laws. Previously the statute required the hearing be held within 72
hours. See infra notes 88-97.
83.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-104(a) (LexisNexis 2003).
84.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105 (LexisNexis 2003).

85.

WYO.

STAT. ANN.

§ 35-21-105(a) (LexisNexis 2003). Recall that a child under 16

years of age is not a "household member." See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2003).
86.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-106(b) (LexisNexis 2003).
87.
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1. Ex parte Orders - Duration of More Than 72 Hours Needs
Limitation
Before the statute was amended in 2003, the DVPO statute required
a judge issuing an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) to hold a hearing within 72 hours after the TRO had been issued."8 A hearing concerning
the issuance of a protective order is required to fulfill the respondent's right
to due process.8 9 Wyoming had a much shorter duration than most states
when it came to the TRO. 90 Wyoming's short time period made it difficult
for petitioners, and their attorneys, to put together a case to present at the
DVPO hearing. 9' When children were involved, the short TRO period also
made it difficult on parties to put a case together and present evidence to the
court regarding what the best interests of the child may be. This made a
court's decisions about custody and visitation difficult, and arguably led to
some poor custody and visitation decisions because of the lack of information the court had on which to base its decision.
On July 1, 2003, the statute was changed to allow a judge to hold a
hearing on a petition for an order of protection "as soon thereafter as the
petition may be heard by the court.. ..'
This is a step in the right direction because it addresses the previous limitations addressed above. A court
can now hold a hearing more than seventy-two (72) hours after the ex-parte
order was issued and not be in violation of the statute. 93 The court must utilize this new tool effectively to ensure parties are given adequate time to find
legal counsel, prepare its case, and in cases where children are involved, to
make decision about custody and visitation based on the best interests of the
child.

88.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-104(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2002).
89.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law). See also Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756 (W.D.
Wis. 1988) (holding that ex parte orders generally do not violate due process); People v.
Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) (holding temporary protection order does
not violate due process when issued before hearing so long as a hearing is held promptly after
issuing the temporary order); In re Penny R., 509 A.2d 338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that
due process required a hearing within 10 days after issuance of an ex parte temporary protection order that discontinued visitation rights).
90.
Waul, supra note 12, at 54. Most states give effect to a TRO for 7-14 days. Id. See
also infra notes 100-109.
91.
It is also difficult on the petitioner because many times she is representing herselfpro
se. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
4
92.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-10 (a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003). This section was amended
by H.R. Bill 0133, 2003 Leg., 57th Sess. (Wyo. 2003), Enrolled Act No. 93, 2003, ch. 173 §
1, 2003 Wyo. Session Laws. One additional change in the statute was to exclude acts of selfdefense from the definition of domestic abuse - another huge step in the right direction.
93.
In the past, courts routinely held hearing beyond the 72 hour time period. One of the
reasons most often used to extend the time was to allow the respondent time to obtain legal
counsel.
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While this is a step in the right direction, the statute as it is now
worded makes it easier to abuse the system.94 Attorneys should only ask for
an extension beyond seventy-two (72) hours, and judges should only grant
extensions, if there is good cause to extend the time beyond seventy-two
(72) hours. Make no mistake, abusers use orders of protection as another
means of controlling their victims. Extending the duration of an ex-parte
order could violate a victim's right to due process. Judges must be cautious
when extending the 72-hour period and make sure the extension is warranted
by good cause. Good cause may be established by showing that a good faith
effort to obtain counsel has been made, or that additional time is necessary to
prepare for custody and visitation matters. Courts of other states have held
that removing a respondent from his residence or suspending rights of visitation with children for up to ten to fourteen (10-14) days does not violate due
process.95 Therefore, Wyoming courts should not allow an extension of A
TRO that contains child custody orders or an order removing a person from
their residence for more than ten (10) days, and no extension should be given
unless warranted by good cause. The legislature should change the language
of the statute to include a "good cause" requirement, define "good cause,99
and add a limitation of seven to ten (7-10) days so no due process rights are
violated.97
2. Duration of Protection Orders
Currently, Wyoming has the shortest duration for protection orders
in the country.9" The Domestic Violence Model Code adopts the position
that the court should determine the duration of protective orders; or in other
words, that the order should remain effective indefinitely until the court de94.
Waul, supra note 12, at 54.
95.
Pendleton v. Minichino, No. 506673, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 915, at *7 (Conn.
Super. Ct. April 2, 1992) (holding that a temporary ex parte protection order which suspended
visitation for 14 days until hearing did not violate due process); Williams v. Marsh, 626
S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982) (holding that a temporary ex parte protection order excluding the
respondent from his home and prohibiting contact with his children for 15 days before a hearing was held did not violate due process); People v. Derisi, 442 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Suffolk
County Ct. 1981) (holding that the respondent must be granted a prompt hearing after an ex
parte temporary protection order denied him access to his home and personal belongings);
Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an ex pane protection order that restrained the respondent from communicating with his wife and effectively
denied him visitation with his children for 10 days prior to the hearing did not violate due
process).
96.
Good cause would include: Additional time to prepare when temporary child custody
and support is an issue, additional time to secure evidence or witnesses essential to the hearing, and additional time to serve the respondent. Requiring an attorney, or a pro se party, to
file an affidavit describing the reasons necessitating the extension, and have an ex pane hearing if necessary, could accomplish this.
97.
See Waul, supra note 12, at 54. Courts have held that a duration of 7-10 days, perhaps as many as 14 days, would not violate due process.
98.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-106(b) (LexisNexis 2003); see infra notes 100-09 (describing the durations of protection orders in all 50 states and D.C.).
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cides the order should be modified or dissolved." Ten states, including
Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Vermont, and Washington, have followed the model code and
place no limits on the duration of protective orders." In Ohio, courts can
enter domestic violence protection orders for a period of five years.'" In
Wisconsin, a court can enter a protective order for a duration asked for by
the petitioner, but not for more than four years. 102 California, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South Dakota courts issue protective orders
for a duration of three years. 3 In California, the DVPO can be renewed for
an additional three years, or indefinitely."° Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana,
99.
See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE:
A MODEL STATE CODE § 306 (1994) [hereinafter "Model Code"]. The Model Code contains
model statutes recommended by judges, battered women's advocates, batterer's defense attorneys, prosecutors, and other legal experts, to effectively combat domestic violence.
100.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2002) (stating that a respondent is indefinitely prohibited
from threatening or committing acts of domestic violence against the petitioner until further
order of the court, but specific prohibitions, such as phone calls, contact, exclusion from
residence, child custody, etc., remain effective for six months; temporary orders remain effective for 10 days); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102 (2002) (stating that protective orders
are unlimited, but that a respondent can apply to the court for dismissal or modification after
issuance; temporary orders are good for 14 days, but can be extended by 14 days for good
cause); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (2002) (stating that protective order shall remain in effect
until modified or dissolved, respondent may petition court for such; temporary order good for
15 days, but may be extended to obtain service); HAW. REv. STAT. § 586- 5.5 (2002) (stating
that a protective order is effective for a reasonable time period to be determined by the court;
a temporary order is good for a period determined by the court, but not more than 90 days);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (2002) (stating that a protective order has no limitation
on duration, but may not be issued for less than 6 months; temporary orders are good for 14
days); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (2002) (stating that a protective order is good until modified or dissolved by the court; a temporary order is good until the hearing is held, usually
within 10 days, but can be extended for good cause); N.D. CNT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (2002)
(stating-that a protective order is effective until modified or dissolved; a temporary order is
good for 14 days); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (2002) (stating that a protective order is
good for whatever duration the court decides; a protective order is good for 15 days, unless
the respondent cannot be served, at which time the order automatically renews for an additional 15 days); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (2002) (stating that protective orders good for
duration as determined by the court; temporary orders good for 10 days); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.50.060 (2002) (stating that the order's duration can be set by the court; a temporary
order is good for 14-24 days).
101.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (2002) (stating that a protective order effective for
up to 5 years; temporary order good for 7 days);
102.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (2002) (stating that a protective order can be issued for up
to four years; a temporary order is good for 14 days).
103.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345 (2002) (stating that the protective order is issued for three
years, but can then be renewed for an indefinite time period; temporary orders are good for 7
days); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.750 (2002) (stating that a protective order is good for three
years, but may be extended fro an additional 3 years; temporary order good for 14 days);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-17 (2002) (stating that a protective order shall not exceed 3 years;
temporary order good for 10 days); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 (Supp. 1993) (stating protective
orders good for three years, may be extended; temporary orders good for 21 days); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5 (2002) (stating protective orders good for 3 years; temporary orders good for 30 days).
104.
See supra note 103.
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Maine, Texas, and Virginia courts can issue protective orders for up to two
years. 5 Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington State all issue DVPOs for at least
one year."° Five states, Connecticut, Georgia, New Mexico, South Carolina,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15- 205 (2002) (stating that protective orders good for 90 days
105.
up to two years, but can be extended; temporary order good for 30 days); 725 ILL. CoMP.
STAT. § 5/112A-20 (2002) (stating that a protective order is good for a period of two years,
but can be extended to satisfy the requirements of the statute; temporary orders are good for
14-21 days); Bums IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9 (2002) (stating that protective orders issued
for two years; temporary orders good for 30 days); 19-A M.R.S. §4007 (2002) (stating that a
protective order is good for 2 years, and may be extended; temporary order good for 21 days);
TEx. FAM. CODE § 85.025 (2002) (allowing protective orders for 2 years; temporary orders
good for 14 days, but may be extended); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (2002) (allowing protective orders to be effective for up to 2 years).
106.
ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (2002) (stating that protective order must be for one year unless
court orders longer or shorter duration, but may be extended; temporary order good for 14
days); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13- 3602 (2002) (stating that the protective order is good for
up to one year; in Arizona, there are no temporary orders, a petitioner is granted a protective
order ex parte if she proves an act of domestic violence; if the respondent wishes to contest
the protective order he may request a hearing); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (2002) (stating
that protective orders good for one year, but may be extended; temporary orders good for 10
days); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (2002) (stating that protective order good for one year, but
may be extended; temporary order good for 14 days); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5 (2002) (stating that protective order good for 1 year, but may be extended; temporary order good for 15
days); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (2002) (stating that protective order good for one year;
temporary order good for 20 days); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2002) (stating that a
protective order is good for up to eighteen months, but can be extended for good cause; temporary order good for 20 days); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506 (2002) (stating that protective orders are good for up to one year, but can be extended for good cause; temporary
orders are good for 7 days after service on respondent); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3
(2002) (stating that protective order good for one year, but may be extended; temporary order
good for 10 days); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (2002) (stating that protective order good for
one year, but may be extended; temporary order good for 14 days); Mo. Rev. Stat. 455.040
(2003) (stating that the protective order is good for up to one year, temporary order good for
15 days); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121 (2002) (stating that protective order good for one
year; temporary order good for 20 days); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-924 (2002) (allowing protective orders for a period of one year; temporary orders for 14 days); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §
33.080 (2002) (stating protective orders issued for 1 year, but may be extended for one additional year; temporary order good for 30 days); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5 (2002) (stating that protective orders issued for 1 year; temporary orders good until respondent requests
hearing); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (2002) (stating that protective orders issued for one year,
unless aggravating circumstances, then issue for three years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B- 3
(2002) (stating that protective orders good for 1 year); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.718 (2002) (allowing protective orders for 1 year; temporary orders good for up to 180 days); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 6108 (2002) (allowing protective orders to be effective for up to 18 months,
but may be extended; temporary orders good for 19 days); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605
(2002) (stating protective order good for 1 year, extended for one year if necessary; temporary
order good for 15 days); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.60 (2002) (stating protective order
good for 1 year; temporary order good for 14 days).
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and West Virginia all issue DVPOs for six months.' °7 It is important to point
out, however, that the vast majority of all these states allow a DVPO to be
extended beyond the original term for which it was issued.'0 8
There are only three states, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming that issue
DVPOs for less than six months.'
The vast majority of states, 42 states
plus the District of Columbia, have DVPOs with durations of at least one
full year."0 In Idaho, although the initial duration of a DVPO is three
months, the order is extended by one full year if the petitioner requests it."'
In Utah, the initial DVPO period is five months, but the judge has the discretion to extend the duration of the initial order far beyond five months if he
indicates, on the record, why more than five months is necessary. 2 Furthermore, in Utah, all that is required is a review by the court at five
months."' The court is not required to set the expiration date of the DVPO
for five months.'
A judge in Utah can decide to review the DVPO at five
months to see if a modification or dissolution is necessary; thus, the duration
of the DVPO could literally be indefinite, only to be "reviewed" every five
months.'
These statistics indicate how far behind Wyoming is when protecting victims of domestic violence. Although DVPOs in Wyoming can be
extended past the three-month period, judges seem very reluctant to extend
them and it is very difficult to get the respondent served again before the

107.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (2002) (stating that a protective order is good for
six months, but may be extended six months at a time upon good cause shown; temporary
orders good for 14 days); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13- 4 (2002) (stating a protective order effective for-six months; a temporary order is good for 10 - 30 days); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6
(2002) (stating that a protective order is good for six months, but can be extended for six
months upon good cause; temporary order good for 72 hours, but may be extended to 10
days); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4- 70 (2002) (stating that a protective order must be effective for
at least six months, but may be issued for one year, and can be extended upon good cause;
temporary order good for 15 days); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-505 (2002) (stating that protective
order good for 90-180 days; temporary order good for 10 days);
108.
See supra notes 100-07.
109. IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (2002) (stating that protective order shall be issued for three
months, extended to one year upon application of petitioner; temporary order good for 14
days); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-64.2 (2002) (stating that the judge sets either an expiration date
of the order, or a date when the order is to be reviewed by the court, but may not exceed five
months unless the court indicates on the record why a date beyond five months is necessary;
temporary order good for 20 days); WYO. STAT. ANN4. § 35-21-106 (LexisNexis 2002) (three
months with unlimited extensions of additional three month durations, each on a showing of
good cause; temporary order good for 72 hours).
110. See supra notes 100-07.
111.
IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (2002).
112. UTAH CODE ANN. § 3064.2 (2002).
113.
Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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protection order expires.' 16 Additionally, the statute requires "good cause"
to extend a DVPO,
but gives no definition or guidance as to what constitutes
"good cause.""' There is no case law in Wyoming that would guide a practitioner as to what constitutes good cause. Furthermore, Circuit Court judges
seem confused as to what constitutes good cause, for good reason. Some
judges in Wyoming even require a showing of further abuse, something the
legislature did not intend." 8 It is time that Wyoming amended its laws so
that domestic violence victims get the protection that they not only deserve,
but the protections that they need, by increasing the durations of its DVPOs.
3. Custody, Visitation, and Support Issues in Extended Orders of
Protection
During recent discussions about increasing the duration of DVPOs
in Wyoming, some judges have expressed concern about the effect an increased duration would have on child custody, visitation, and support issues.
Even without a change in the duration, Wyoming needs to change the DVPO
statute to adequately address these issues in DVPO proceedings. Nevertheless, along with the change in the DVPO duration, the statute should be
changed to address the increased time period as reflected in other state
DVPO statutes.
The current statute in Wyoming grants a court the power to "award
temporary custody of any children involved to the petitioner" when the
"court finds it to be in the best interests of the children."".9 This language
differs from the Wyoming child custody statute that reads: "Custody shall
be crafted to promote the best interests of the children, and may include any
combination of joint, shared or sole custody."'' 0 The Wyoming statute does
not address the issue of custody and visitation in terms of the best interest of
the child. Rather, the statute allows the petitioner custody if in the best interests of the child. Additionally, a Wyoming court can also "[o]rder the
payment of child support" in a DVPO proceeding.' The Wyoming statute
also does not require the court to follow the presumptive guidelines when
ordering child support in the DVPO proceeding.

116.
See infra notes 186-210 and accompanying text (discussing extending protection
orders for "good cause"). See also Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-104, 106 (LexisNexis 2003)

(stating that the order of protection cannot exceed three months, meaning that it expires at the
three month time limit unless the court has extended the order, which can only occur after the
respondent has been served and a hearing is scheduled and held). The burden of having the
respondent served again and a hearing held before the order expires falls on the petitioner, so
if no hearing is held before the order expires the petitioner would have to re-file.
117. WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 35-21-106(b) (LexisNexis 2003).
118.
See infra notes 186-210 and accompanying text.
119. WYo. STAT. ANN.§ 35-21-105(bXi) (LexisNexis 2003).
120. WYO.STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(d) (LexisNexis 2003).
121.
WYO.STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(bXii) (LexisNexis 2003).
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Aside from possible changes in the duration of DVPOs, the statute
needs to be changed to be harmonized with the child custody and support
statutes so that there is uniform application of child support and a requirement that a court determine the best interest of the child. This is only logical, as custody and visitation should be based upon the best interests of the
child, and support should be set based on income. Harmonizing the statutes
would also require a court to "consider evidence of spousal abuse or child
abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the children."' 22
When examining the statutes of states with DVPO durations longer
than Wyoming, it becomes clear how these "issues" are really non-issues if
the Wyoming statutes cross-referenced the proper statutes. For example,
California has a DVPO duration of three years."2 A DVPO in California can
address issues of custody, visitation, and child support. 24 Rather than have
special rules for child support, custody, and visitation in the DVPO statute,
the California DVPO statute refers to the California Family Code concerning
visitation and custody, 2 ' and the California statute addressing presumptive
child support."' The California statute bases the custody and visitation of
children during the DVPO period on the best interests of the child.'27 Likewise, child support is figured just as it would be in a regular child custody
determination using the presumptive support guidelines.'2 8
In California, DVPOs addressing custody, visitation, and support

matters are issued without prejudice.' 29 Therefore, petitioners and respondents are free to bring a petition to establish custody, visitation, and child
support at any time, even while the DVPO is in effect, just as they would if
no DVPO had been issued. The California statutes encourage the court issuing the permanent custody, visitation, and/or support order to harmonize the
permanent order with the DVPO whenever possible. Courts are required to
harmonize the two orders unless not possible, or if the best interests of the

122. WYO.STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(c) (LexisNexis 2003). What is interesting about the
organization of the Wyoming statutes is that DVPO statutes make no reference to the child
custody statute, which states that domestic violence shall be considered contrary to the best
interests of the child. Additionally, the child custody statutes are found in Chapter 2 of Title
20, the dissolution of marriage section. While it makes sense that a judge or an attorney
would refer to the child castody statute when making a custody determination in a DVPO
proceeding, just as a court refers to the child custody statute even when there is no "dissolution of marriage," when there is no express cross-reference the statute is considered ambiguous and subject to varying interpretations.
123.
CAL. FAM.CODE § 6345 (West 2003).
124. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6223 (West 2003) (addressing visitation and custody); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6341 (West 2003) (addressing child support).
125. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6223 (West 2003).
126. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6341(West 2003).
127. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 et seq. (West 2003); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6323 (West 2003).
128.

CAL. FAM. CODE § 6341 (West 2003); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3500 et seq. (West 2003)

129.

CAL. FAM. CODE § 6323(b) (West 2003).
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child require otherwise. 3 ' Additionally, orders involving divorce, nullity of
marriage, or legal separation can include a DVPO without having to bring a
separate action.'
Rather than create separate statutes, the statutes in California reference each other. This way there are not separate standards depending on what type of action a party brings.
In Nevada, a state with a duration of one year for a DVPO,' the
same method is used. A court issuing a DVPO can order custody, visitation,
and support in a DVPO proceeding.' 33 The court issuing the DVPO makes a
determination of what is in the best interests of the child just as the court
would if it were deciding permanent custody.' This is logical and focuses
on the purpose of what a custody determination should, the best interests of
the child. Additionally,
a determination by the court after an evidentiary hearing and
finding by clear and convincing evidence that either parent
or any other person seeking custody has engaged in one or
more acts of domestic violence against the child, a parent of
the child or any other person residing with the child creates
a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody of the
child by the perpetrator of the domestic violence is not in
the best interest of the child.'35
As stated in the Wyoming statute, domestic violence is contrary to
the best interests of the child. In Nevada, however, this creates a rebuttable
presumption that the best interests of the child are not served when custody
is given to the batterer. This should also be adopted by Wyoming. In Nevada, as in California, a DVPO does not act "in lieu of" another civil proceeding, such as a custody proceeding; thus, a parent can bring a separate
action for
custody, visitation, and support even during the pendency of the
36
DVPO.1
A longer duration for a DVPO in Wyoming should not be an issue.
In Wyoming, the DVPO statute should cross reference the custody and visitation statutes rather than creating a new scheme. Cross-referencing statutes
focuses on the best interests of the child and is fair to all concerned parties.
A Wyoming court now has the authority to issue custody orders for three
months. It is not acceptable to argue that a Circuit Court can determine custody of a child for three months, but not longer. This somehow suggests that
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

CAL. FAM. CODE §
CAL. FAM. CODE §
NEV. REV. STAT. §
NEV. REv. STAT. §
NEV. REV. STAT. §

3031(a) (West 2003).
6360 (West 2003).
33.080 (2003).
33.030 (2003).
125.480(5) (2003).

Id.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.040 (2003).
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the custody order made by a Circuit Court was a mistake. That kind of mistake would not be acceptable for any duration, three days or three months.
Additionally, what happens at the end of the three months? One scenario is
that there is another "incident" of domestic abuse over child custody. An
extended DVPO protects all parties, the petitioner, the children, and the respondent.
The vast majority of jurisdictions around the country have a DVPO
duration of up to one year. These states have made it work. One reason is
that if a party to a DVPO proceeding really feels that there has been a mistake in custody, visitation, or support, or even if they want to try and change
the lower court's order, they can bring an action for custody and support in
District Court as soon as the day after the DVPO has been issued. The statute must require that a District Court be made aware of the DVPO; thus, the
District Court can inform the Circuit Court that an order concerning custody,
visitation, and support had been entered. The Circuit Court could then modify its order to reference the District Court's custody, visitation, and support
order. Nevertheless, the District Court should attempt to harmonize the
permanent order with the DVPO unless it is not in the best interests of the
child.
There are going to be times when the Circuit Court cannot order custody or visitation because paternity has not been established. In these types
of scenarios, a District Court is going to have to make a paternity determination anyway. Therefore, a Circuit Court's order concerning custody will be
simple and not require a custody determination.
It is, of course, favorable to have the District Court make all custody, visitation, and support decisions. Nevertheless, victims of domestic
violence have the right to be protected. So do the children. As the research
outlined above has indicated, domestic violence has a serious effect on children, not only when they are actually physically abused, but also when they
witness or even hear domestic abuse. This is a serious subject. Courts must
take DVPO proceedings very seriously. Most victims of domestic violence
do not seek DVPOs because they have been hit once. Courts must understand the dynamics of domestic abuse and understand that these are emergency proceedings meant to protect the person seeking the DVPO. It is not
an ideal situation. It is, however, an important proceeding that will affect the
victims and the children involved.
We must give judges the tools to protect victims and children. This
tool should not be limited to three months simply because we do not understand - and it is difficult to understand how and why domestic violence occurs. How can someone beat another person? How can someone beat a
small child? How can someone be so cruel to another? The reality is that
domestic violence does occur, more frequently and with more devastating
effects than we want to admit. A majority of citizens of the United States
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/6

20

Thueson: Civil Domestic Violence Protection Orders in Wyoming: Do They Pro

2004 CIVIL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDERS IN WYOMING

291

and Wyoming, are decent, kind people. This is one reason why domestic
violence is so difficult to understand.
The majority of jurisdictions with DVPO durations of one year or
more use the method of cross-referencing applicable statutes. This method
ensures that these issues are adequately addressed when the duration of a
DVPO is more than three months. This method of resolving custody, visitation, and support issues also ensures that there is uniform application of the
law, and that the best interests of the child are followed even when the duration of a DVPO is only three months. This is how DVPO orders should be
issued; without regard to the duration. Changing the statute in Wyoming to
cross-reference the statute concerning child custody whenever deciding a
child custody issue, and cross-referencing the child support statute when
determining child support, will only make the law easier to apply and more
uniform in application.
4. Custody and Visitation Considerations in DVPO Proceedings
Generally, courts should immediately suspend any visitation rights
the respondent has when it appears from the facts alleged in a request for a
temporary order that there is a danger of further abuse, or at least require that
visitation be supervised.'37 Research supports the concept that the respondent's visitation rights should be completely suspended for the duration of
the temporary protection order. A study performed by the National Institute
of Justice ("NIJ") found that the potential for renewed violence is greatest
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
during visitation."3
Judges ("NCJFCJ") also notes that since visitation provides the batterer with

continued access to the victim through the children, violence against the
petitioner often continues when visitation is allowed.'39 Additionally, "A
batterer may seek visitation with the children in an effort to maintain contact
with and control over the abuse victim;"'4 4thus, "[v]isitation remains a catalyst for continued intimidation and abuse." 11
137.

See Model Code, supra note 99, § 306 (indicating that visitation should be, at the very

least, supervised).
138.

PErER FINN & SARAH COLSON, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, CIvIL PROTECTION

ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 4, 43 (1990), cited in

Klein & Orloff, supra note 8, at 811 n. 19.
139.
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE
PROJECT, FAMILY VIOLENCE: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE, RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES (1990), reprinted in 41 Juv. &
FAM. CT.J. 26 (1990).
140. JUDGE BEN GADDIS, DOMESTIC ABUSE PROTECTION ORDER CONCEPTS 8 (1992), cited
in Klein & Orloff, supra note 8, at 1034 n.1437.

141. TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, FINAL REPORT 141, 151 (May 1992) (finding that
if petitioner is represented by
civil protection orders are more likely to be awarded after trial
counsel and fewer cases are returned to files without court action. The report concluded that
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In Wyoming, visitation options and judges' decisions are difficult
because of the limited resources available providing places or people to supervise child visitation. This leads to the conclusion that if sufficient information appears on the face of the affidavit for a DVPO, there should be no
visitation allowed during the TRO period. 42 At the very least, judges must
consider that those who abuse someone such as a wife, a girlfriend, or husband are more likely to abuse children. This fact alone should give a judge
pause when deciding custody and visitation arrangements. The best interests
of the child should be the focus. Their best interests are served by protecting
them from abuse. The focus must shift away from the "rights" of parents to
their children, like children are a type of property, and onto the rights of the
children to be raised free from harm and fear.
5. Child Custody in Protection Orders - Previous Child Custody
Orders
In Wyoming, there is also confusion as to whether a judge's granting
of temporary child custody in a DVPO can supercede a previous order in a
child custody proceeding from a District Court. Wyoming's DVPO statute
states that a judge can grant the petitioner temporary custody of children in
However, Wyoming's statute also
an ex parte or final protective order.'
makes clear that an order entered by any court under the Domestic Violence
Protection Act, whether the DVPO comes from a District Court or Circuit
Court, cannot supercede a previous order from a District Court if the parties
in the protection order proceeding were parties in the original District Court
proceeding.'" Thus, if the parties have already been through a child custody
proceeding, and an order was entered concerning custody and visitation, the
counsel should be appointed to represent petitioners in civil protection order contempt actions
for enforcement and that representation of petitioners by members of the private bar should be
encouraged), cited in Klein & Orloff, supra note 8, at 845 n.213.
142. See generally supra note 97 (stating that suspension of visitation for up to 14 days
does not violate due process).
143. WYO.STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(b) (LexisNexis 2003).
144. The Wyoming statute states:
(a) Any order entered in a district court in this state in a proceeding
where the petitioner and respondent are parties shall supercede any inconsistent language in any other order entered under this act or in any other
court proceeding in this state.
(b) Any order entered under this act shall supercede any inconsistent
language in any other order other than the one issued by a district court
proceeding described in subsection (a) of this section.
WYo.STAT. ANN. § 35-21-108(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2003). A District Court, even the same

District Court that issued the custody or visitation order, cannot modify an order in a DVPO
proceeding. A District Court with proper jurisdiction may only modify a custody or visitation
order upon the application of one of the parties. "[A] petition of one of the parents seeking
modification of an existing order is a statutory prerequisite to the court's power to act." Erhart v. Evans, 30 P.3d 542, 546 (Wyo. 2001).
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petitioner would not have the option of obtaining a protective order that includes modified custody or visitation against the other party to the previous
child custody proceeding. This is completely backwards because it is very
likely that this may be the person from which the petitioner is seeking protection. Moreover, because the Wyoming DVPO statute does not include
children as "household members," a batterer could continue to use the children as a means of power and control over the petitioner, or worse, continue
to abuse the children.
Many judges in Wyoming now believe that they have the power to
alter custody or visitation, even if another order from a District Court is in
place, because a DVPO is a means to protect the petitioner and the children.
These judges believe they have broad, plenary power to protect the children
and do what is in the children's best interest. 45 Nevertheless, the statute is
clear that courts issuing DVPOs do not have this power. For advocates and
attorneys representing victims of domestic violence, the fact that the court
does not have this power should be very disturbing."
As mentioned earlier, those who abuse their adult partners are much
more likely to abuse their children. 4" A victim of domestic violence in
Wyoming is helpless to protect her children from an abusive partner if a
previous custody or visitation order is in place, unless or until she is able to
modify the previous order in District Court. This is true even if the victim
knows that there is child abuse and presents incontrovertible evidence of
abuse to the issuing court, unless the Department of Family Services intervenes and takes protective custody of the children. A petitioner does have
the option of petitioning the original District Court where the custody or
visitation order was entered to modify the order." 8 This process, however,
takes time the children may not have if the abuser takes custody because he
has the right under the original District Court order.
The Wyoming statute should be amended to allow a court issuing a
DVPO to temporarily modify custody and/or visitation if it appears from the
facts that a modification is warranted to protect the children, or is in the
children's best interests. 49 In Idaho, the Supreme Court recognized the im-

See infra Section "III(D)" (containing real life examples of this notion).
145.
146. For a real life example of why this should be disturbing, one need only look to the
case of Jessica Gonzales in Denver, Colorado. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d
1258 (10th Cir. 2002). In the Gonzales case, Ms. Gonzales' three children were murdered by
their father even while a protective order was in place. See infra note 233.
147. See supranotes 40, 77 and accompanying text.
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 20-5-104 (LexisNexis 2003). See also supra note 144.
148.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3064 (West 2003). The California statute allows a court to
149.
modify a custody order, even ex parte, if there has "been a showing of immediate harm to the
" Id. "'Immediate
child or immediate risk that the child will be removed from the [s]tate ....
harm to the child' includes having a parent who has committed acts of domestic violence,
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portance of protecting children within the purview of a domestic violence
statute. 5 ' In the Ellibee case, the petitioner sought and obtained an order of
protection from her ex-husband. 5' The Ellibees had already obtained an
order regarding custody and visitation from a separate District Court."' Like
Wyoming, the issuing court retains jurisdiction over the original order in
Idaho; thus, Mr. Ellibee claimed that the court issuing the protective order
did not have jurisdiction to affect his custody and visitation rights.'53 The
Idaho court recognized that the domestic violence statute gave courts authority to "temporarily" affect child custody rights even though a prior order is
in effect. 5 4 The court concluded, "Clearly, the Act empowered Judge
Harden with wide discretion to engage in "best interest" analysis, and upon
his determination that William (ex-husband) had caused Tolen's (the child)
bruises and the children were in immediate danger of further domestic violence, to temporarily alter William's custody rights awarded under the prior
decree.""'
Children are often referred to as the "silent victims" in domestic
abuse because they are often forgotten when the focus is on the abused partner or the batterer 56 Exposure to domestic violence, as well as being
abused themsdlves, has a very adverse effect on children. 5 7 For Wyoming
to allow a way for batterers to continue to use children as a means of power
and control over their victims, or to allow them to continue to abuse and
victimize the children through this statute, is incomprehensible. Wyoming
must change this part of the statute to allow courts the ability to consider the
best interests of the children when issuing DVPOs. In fact, the Wyoming
legislature must mandate, as it does in the child custody statute, that domestic abuse is contrary to the best interests of the children and give courts the
ability to limit a batterer's access to the children involved.'

where the court determines that the acts of domestic violence are of recent origin or are a part
of a demonstrated and continuing pattern of acts of domestic violence." Id.
Ellibee v. Ellibee, 826 P.2d 462 (Idaho 1992).
150.
151.
Id. at 463.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Id. at 465.
154.
155. Id. at 466.
156. See generally GEORGE HOLDEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH INTO ANOTHER
CONSEQUENCE OF FAMILY VIOLENCE; CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE: THEORY,

RESEARCH AND APPLIED ISSUES

(G.W. Holden, R. Geffner & E.N. Jouriles, eds. 1998).

157. Id. at 6-11; see also supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
158.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(c) (LexisNexis 2003) (stating that evidence of abuse
shall be considered as contrary to the best interests of children).
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Changes at the Trial Court Level
1. Findings of Domestic Violence

Wyoming courts must find that an act of domestic abuse has occurred before entering an order of protection. There has been some discussion around the state that the there is no need for a court issuing a DVPO to
make a finding that domestic violence has occurred. 5 9 This interpretation,
however, does "violence" to the statute itself, by undermining the clear and
unambiguous language of the statue, by undermining the clear intent of the
statute, and by advocating a court's self-legislating.
First, the clear and unambiguous language of the statute states:
"Upon finding that an act of domestic abuse has occurred, the court shall
enter an order of protection .... ."" When interpreting a statute, the "legislative intent" must first be ascertained. 6' The Wyoming Supreme Court has
stated:
Legislative intent must be ascertained initially and primarily
from the words used in the statute. When the words are
clear and unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible substitution of its own views, or those of others, for the intent of
the legislature if any effort is made to interpret or construe
statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by the
legislature. Our precedent demonstrates that this rule also is
an absolute. 62
The Court continues, "We previously have articulated the proposition that a statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain
and subject to varying interpretations."' 6 3 When interpreting this statute, the
clear and unambiguous language is controlling.

159.
Some judges in Wyoming have openly expressed the opinion that although the Wyoming statute states that a court shall issue a DVPO upon a finding that domestic violence has
occurred, the statute does not state that the court cannot issue a DVPO if it does not make a
finding that an act of domestic violence has occurred; thus, allowing a respondent to stipulate
to the court issuing a DVPO without any finding by the court. This option, to allow a respondent to stipulate to the isuance of a DVPO, was actually an option for courts contained
within the standard forms. See supra note 5. However, the latest standard form has changed
the language to allow the "parties [to] stipulate that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over
them under the Domestic Violence Protection Act even though the Respondent may dispute
that he or she has committed an act of domestic violence against the Petitioner."
160.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(a) (LexisNexis 2003).
161.
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo.

1991).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Nowhere in the statute does the language allow a court to issue a
protective order for any reason other than because there is domestic violence. Arguing that the statute is "silent" as to whether an order can be entered even if the court does not make a finding that domestic violence has
occurred is analogous to arguing that an order of protection can be issued
when the court expressly finds that there has been no domestic violence.
The statute does not expressly state that a court cannot issue an order of protection even if it finds there has been absolutely no domestic violence. This
argument just does not make sense.
The argument that the statute is silent also fails because the clear
language and intent of the statute indicates that an order of protection is
meant to protect victims of domestic violence. Wyoming statutory history is
hard to come by, but in this case the legislature attached a preamble when it
passed this Act: "AN ACT to create W.S. 35-21-101 through 35-21-107
relating to public health and safety; providing for injunctive relief from acts
of domestic abuse .... "" Clearly, this statute is intended to provide a petitioner relief from acts of domestic abuse. If there has been no domestic
abuse, there is nothing that merits relief; thus, the primary purpose of the
statute is frustrated if a DVPO is issued without a finding that there has been
acts of domestic abuse.
Furthermore, when interpreting a statute a court interprets a statute
in pari materia, or according to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the
words in relation to their arrangement and connection to the statute as a
whole.'65 Since title 35, chapter 21 was passed as an Act, the entire Act
should be interpreted together. In the "Domestic Violence Protection Act," a
court is given the power to dramatically affect the lives of the petitioner and
respondent. The court has the power to remove a respondent from his home,
deny him visitation with his own children, order him to pay child support or
monetary support to the petitioner, and the power to order anything else
"[the court] deems necessary for the protection of the petitioner, the children, or other family or household member."'" The order is good for up to
three months or longer if extended for good cause, 67 is reported into a statewide registry,'" and is enforceable in every other state in the union.'
Vio7
0
lation of an order of protection is a crime in Wyoming.
Additionally, contrary to the belief of some prosecutors and judges, any issuance of an order
164.
Family Violence Protection Act of 1982, Session Laws of Wyoming, ch 45 (1982).
165.
Murphy v. State Canvassing Bd., 12 P.3d 677, 679 (Wyo. 2000).
166.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
167.
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 35-21-106(b) (LexisNexis 2003).
168.
WYO.STAT. ANN.§ 35-21-110 (LexisNexis 2003).
169.
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 35-21-109 (LexisNexis 2003); see also Violence Against Women
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 et seq. (giving full faith and credit to each states' orders of protection).
170.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4404 (LexisNexis 2003).
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of protection, even if the respondent stipulates to its issuance and the court
does not specifically "find" that an act of domestic violence has occurred,
prohibits the respondent from possessing any firearm or ammunition.'
The use of the word "shall" in the statute also exemplifies why a
finding of domestic violence must be made before an order of protection can
be issued. The Wyoming Supreme Court has already made clear the word
"shall" means the content is mandatory and that the directive must be
obeyed."' The legislature's choice of the word shall indicates how seriously
this subject is to be taken. If there is domestic violence, the court must issue
an order protecting the victim. Considering the breadth of areas the issuance
of a protective order effects, and the areas the legislatures give the courts the
authority to affect, there is no question that the issuance of DVPOs are seri171.
This is an important point. Some prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, think
that if a respondent stipulates to an order of protection, he avoids the prohibition of possessing firearms contained in the federal firearms statute because the court has made no "finding"
of domestic violence. This, however, is absolutely false. The federal firearms state, situated
at 18 U.S.C. § 922, states:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person(8) who is subject to a court order that(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual
notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an
intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or per-son, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in
reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(C)
(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible
threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that
would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; or
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce.
Thus, if the DVPO was issued: I) after a hearing of which the respondent received notice,
and had an opportunity to participate (if the respondent is stipulating to a DVPO at a hearing
this is obviously fulfilled); 2) and restrains the respondent from threatening or abusing (an
order of protection automatically fulfills this, see Wvo. STAT §35-21-105(a) (LexisNexis
2003); and 3) the court either makes a "finding" of a credible threat, OR prohibits the use of
force, again see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(a) (LexisNexis 2003) (all three criteria are met
in Wyoming just by issuing an order of protection), a respondent is restrained from possessing
any firearm or ammunition during the term of the DVPO under the federal firearms statute.
Therefore, any protection order issued in Wyoming, whether stipulated to or not, whether a
"finding" of domestic violence or not, automatically precludes possession of a firearm under
federal law.
172. In re Gonzales v. Wyoming, ex rel. Worker's Corn. Div., 992 P.2d 560, 562 (Wyo.
1999).
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ous business.' Therefore, a court should not issue an order this serious
without first considering the consequences, nor could the legislature have
intended a court to enter an order this serious without making the requisite
finding before issuance as mandated by the statutory language. This would
necessarily include the issuance of a DVPO to a batterer who is attempting
to obtain the DVPO against the petitioner in a separate proceeding. The
victim may have used some sort of self-defense, or the batterer may be trying to use the DVPO as retaliation. These types of problems would be
avoided if a court considered the seriousness of DVPOs.
Finally, as indicated by the Appellate Court of Illinois, when a respondent "agreed" to the issuance of an order of protection, but did not
"stipulate to a factual basis of abuse," the finding of abuse was implied. 4
The Illinois court in the Lutz case concluded: "[T]he parties' consent to the
original plenary order of protection essentially conceded the factual basis
necessary to support that order."' 7 s The Lutz court points out that a factual
basis is necessary to support the court's issuance of an order of protection; a
stipulation by the respondent essentially concedes the facts as contained in
the petitioner's affidavit so that the court has the support it needs before it
can issue a DVPO. Currently the Wyoming form application for an order of
protection states: "The parties stipulate that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over them under the Domestic Violence Act even though the Respondent may dispute that he or she has committed an act of domestic abuse
'
against
the Petitioner.
This language
changed because it does
not accurately
represent a DVPO's
meaningmust
and be
consequences.
If a respondent stipulates to the issuance of a DVPO, he "essentially" stipulates to the allegations contained in the petitioner's affidavit.'"
He is still subject to criminal sanctions and the federal firearms laws even if
the court does not check the box that indicates the court finds an act of domestic violence has occurred. 7 Furthermore, "A judgment in a civil action
is not ordinarily admissible as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution.""" The standard in a criminal proceeding is "beyond a reasonable
doubt," but in a civil proceeding, such as a hearing for a DVPO, the standard
is "preponderance of the evidence."'8 0 For this reason, "Judgments in criminal cases are generally inadmissible to establish the facts of a civil case, and

173.

See supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing the areas of a respondent's life

a protection order effects).
174.
175.
176.

Lutz v. Lutz, 728 N.E.2d 1234, 1237 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000).
Id.
See supra note 10.
177. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
178.
See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
179.
Hodges v. State, 222 P.2d 386, 388 (Okla.1950) (citations omitted), cited in Craver v.
State, 942 P.2d 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 1997).
180.
In re Avery, 47 P.3d 973, 976 (Wyo. 2002).
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vice versa."'' Thus, if a respondent has also been criminally charged for the
same conduct contained in the affidavit accompanying the petition for an
order of protection, the outcome of the DVPO has no bearing on the criminal
case. If a respondent chooses to testify at the DVPO hearing, the testimony
could be used to impeach him at the criminal trial; however, the respondent
has nothing to fear if he is really telling the truth." 2
Because no one can force a respondent to incriminate himself by testifying, a respondent can invoke his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and choose not to testify.' a This means that the petitioner can
choose to present evidence at the hearing or can rely on her sworn affidavit
as sufficient evidence to create the factual basis to justify the court's issuance of a DVPO. Either way, the court has made a "finding" contrary to the
current language in the standard form. Furthermore, because this is a civil
case, the court cannot enter into a one-sided stipulation with the respondent
while ignoring the wishes of the petitioner.' Either both parties must stipulate to the court entering a DVPO without a formal hearing, or the hearing
must take place. The form should be changed so that the current "stipulation" language is deleted and replaced with two additional boxes that read:
"The Respondent chose not to present any evidence," and "The parties stipulate to the Court's jurisdiction under the Domestic Violence Act and to the
Court's issuance of an order of protection." This way if the civil order is
brought up in a criminal trial, the judge in the criminal trial can refuse to
allow it as evidence because the respondent presented no evidence and the
DVPO has no relevance or probative valde in the criminal case."8 5 Based on
the foregoing, Wyoming courts must make a finding, one way or another
(i.e. express or implied), that an act of domestic abuse has occurred before
issuing an order of protection pursuant to Wyoming statutory law.

181.
Hodges, 222 P.2d at 388 (citations omitted).
182.
See Wyo. R. EvID. 607, 801(d)(1). The only time previous testimony would be relevant is if the respondent / defendant told two different stories on two different occasions. The
previous testimony would be admissible to impeach him Additionally, the concern that the
defendant's statements would be used against him is ludicrous because anything the defendant says is admissible as a statement of a party opponent. See Wyo. R. EViD. 801 (d)(2).
183.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
184.
This is a basic principle that some have forgotten. When a petitioner asks the court to
issue a DVPO, due process in a civil context requires an opportunity for both parties to be
heard. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard"). When a court, on its own, fashions an agreement between the respondent and the court, without allowing the petitioner the opportunity to
present what she was there to present in the first place, the court violates the due process

rights of the petitioner. Furthermore, no rule or statute gives a court the authority to enter into
an agreement with a respondent, defendant, or whomever, that affects a third party, without
obtaining the consent of the third party (i.e. plaintiff).
185. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004

29

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 4 [2004], No. 1, Art. 6
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 4

2. Considering Past Abuse - Good Cause
As mentioned previously, the Wyoming statute allows a DVPO to
be extended in three-month increments upon "good cause."' 6 The statute
itself, however, does not define what constitutes good cause. Case law in
this area of Wyoming law is non-existent. There is not one decision from
the Wyoming Supreme Court that would guide a court or practitioner as to
what constitutes good cause. While it would be helpful if the legislature
would add a definition of "good cause" to the statute, common sense and
other states' case law provide some guidance as to what constitutes good
cause.
The first and most important point to understand is that a victim
does not, and should not have to prove that there have been additional occurrences of domestic violence or a violation of the current protective order
before obtaining an extension. It has already been shown that the intent of
this statute is to protect victims of domestic violence.' 7 The intent of the
statute is frustrated when victims have good reasons for extending orders of
protection even though there has not been a violation of the order. First, if
the legislature had wanted a black and white line that required a violation of
the order before it could be extended, the legislature could have required this
in the language of the statute.'88 This, of course, is not the case. In order to
really understand why a court cannot and should not require a violation of
the current order before allowing a DVPO to be extended, a court must understand the basics of the domestic violence paradigm.
The domestic violence paradigm has been described above as a
"wheel of power and control."' 89 Most victims of domestic violence do not
come to the court seeking an order of protection the first time they have been
abused. 0 In fact, it has been shown that many victims have been subjected
to abuse for as many as five years before seeking assistance. 9 ' Additionally,
courts must understand that separation is a process, not an event. 92 Chances
for violence increase during separation, both in frequency and in severity.'
This is one of the reasons why virtually every state has increased the duration of their protective orders to at least one year.' Although an order from
the court is not going to stop an abuser if he really wants to abuse his victim,
186.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-106(b) (LexisNexis 2003).
187. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
188.
Gaab v. Ochsner, 636 N.W.2d 669, 671 n.1 (N.D. 2001) (stating that had the legislature intended to require a certain showing by the petitioner, they could have so provided in the
statute).
189. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
191.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
192.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
193.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
194.
See supra notes 100-07.
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an order of protection serves several important purposes in the "coordinated
efforts" approach."" An order of protection gives the victim some sense of
security."'6 An order of protection also serves as one means to get the victim
the assistance necessary to protect her from abuse, to build the necessary
support network to give her the ability to leave the abuser, and to provide
necessary means of survival for her, and perhaps for her children as well.'
Other courts that have addressed this issue recognize the need not to
place too high a hurdle before petitioners seeking an extension of a DVPO.
In North Dakota, the Supreme Court recognized that a petitioner has a rather
low threshold to meet in order to obtain an extension. 8 The court recognized that the petitioner was afraid of the respondent when she testified,
"I'm afraid of what might happen to me if I don't get another protection order because I do not trust him and he violated the first protection order, and
I'm afraid."'" Although the respondent in this case had violated the initial
order, driving by her apartment and making harassing phone calls, the court
found no need to focus on the violation because the petitioner was "afraid,"
and the "act of domestic violence which formed the basis for the original
order occurred less than a year prior to the Petitioner bringing her petition to
extend that order," giving the court sufficient reason to extend the order.2"
A trial court has broad discretion when extending orders of protection because the statute must be construed "liberally, with a view to effecting its
objects and to promoting justice;" thus, a trial court's decision to extend an
order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review.20 '
In another case from Illinois, the court did not look for a violation of
the protection order, or even any changes for that matter; rather, the court
extended the order of protection based on the initial complaint for the order
of protection. 2 In Lutz, the "trial court relied on the original plenary order
as the basis for the extension."2 3 Although the respondent had "agreed" to
the original protection order, but did not stipulate to any actual "findings,"
the court found that the respondent "essentially conceded the factual basis
necessary to support that order."' ' The court held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion when it extended the order of protection solely based on
the allegations contained in the original order.0"

195.
196.
197.

See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.

198.
199.
200.

Gaab v. Ochsner, 636 N.W.2d 669 (N.D. 2001).
Id. at 672.
Id.

201.

Id. at 671; see also Lutz v. Lutz, 728 N.E.2d 1234, 1236-37 (Il. App. Ct. 2000).

202.
203.
204.
205.

Lutz, 728 N.E.2d at 1237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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These court decisions make one point very clear: A petitioner need
not be in "immediate peril" before an order of protection, or an extension of
that order, is issued.2" This is an important point for courts to remember not
only when deciding whether to issue an extension of a DVPO, but when a
court is deciding whether to issue a DVPO in the first instance. As the Utah
court explained, "[I]f past abuse is coupled with a present threat of future
abuse, a person may seek a protective order. ' 20 7 A court, when issuing a
DVPO or an extension to a DVPO, must consider the "evidence it its totality. ' ' 208 As the Utah court stated, "[I]n light of the husband's past abusive
behavior, sufficient evidence exists to infer a present intent to inflict fear or
imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault within the meaning of the
Domestic Abuse Act. ' '201 If a victim expresses a reasonable concern of future domestic abuse, based on present or past conditions, the court must look
at this evidence in totality when deciding whether to issue an extension of a
DVPO. If a victim has a reasonable concern for her future safety based on
past acts, a Wyoming court must issue an extension of an order of protection, especially, as was pointed out by the Lutz court, if the abuse has taken
place within the last year before the petitioner is seeking the extension.21 0
3. Training for Judges and Court Structure
In order for anyone, including judges, to be effective in the battle
against domestic violence, one must have the necessary training, understanding, and resources to do the job. Judicial education is an important part of
the battle against domestic violence for many reasons: Courts are a "crucial
part of the system, bearing the ultimate responsibility for case outcomes;"
courts have "leverage" others do not; a court can "address the needs of the
many victims coming through its doors, providing them links to services;
monitor the behavior of perpetrators and mandate them to appropriate interventions;" and use the authority of the bench to "demonstrate publicly the
commitment that the system has to ending domestic violence., 21 1 Curricula
have been established "to guide the development of a comprehensive judicial
educational program on civil court cases where domestic violence is an issue."212 Additionally, models of how states can establish "domestic violence
courts" have been established so that these types of special cases can be
dealt with most efficiently and effectively.2t3 Court options include: A
206.
See Gaab v. Ochsner, 636 N.W.2d 669, 671 (N.D. 2001); Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P.2d
532, 534 (Utah App. Ct. 1992).
207. Strollo, 828 P.2d at 534.
208. Id.
209. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
210.
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
211.
SACK, supra note 59, at 1.
212. CARTER, supra note 14.
213.
See generally SACK, supra note 59 (establishing several model domestic violence
courts that states can use to develop their own method of dealing with these types of cases
within the states' current court structure).
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dedicated judge, trained in domestic violence handling all domestic violence
protection orders and related cases (such as divorce, child custody), specially
trained support staff, and links to victim resources through the court when
victims first have contact with the court, whether through petitions for protection orders or otherwise."
A current judge, the Honorable Pamela M. Macktaz, an Associate
Justice sitting on the Rhode Island Family Court, has recognized some of the
current shortcomings in the judicial system and advocates change. 2" Justice
Macktaz recognizes that the general belief within the justice system is that
"marital privacy" is a "sacred cow" and the "unspoken reaction of the law
enforcement community. 216 Justice Macktaz "finds it inconceivable that
there was an extended period of time when the criminal justice system responded one way to 'stranger' violence and another way to violence between
intimates." 2' 7 The "rule of thumb" to which Justice Macktaz refers continues
today, although not as prevalent as it once was.2 " Domestic violence in this
country is increasing: In 1987 a battered woman in Massachusetts was murdered every 22 days, in 1991 every 16 days, in 1992 every 9 days, and in the
first quarter of 1993 every six days.2" 9 "[T]rial court judges can have a major impact on preventing domestic violence."22 Although this is far too
lengthy a topic to adequately address in this article, courts have an important
role to play in preventing domestic violence. Resources are available for
attorneys, judges, courts, boards, and legislatures to review and utilize to
effectively combat domestic violence.2 2'
C. Changes With Law Enforcement
1.Training - Self Defense
It goes without saying that law enforcement plays a critical role in
the battle against domestic violence. Police officers may be the first contact
a victim of domestic violence has with someone who can help when responding to a call. First, police officers and other law enforcement officials
must realize the special problems associated with investigating domestic
214.
215.

Id.at9.
Pamela Macktaz, Domestic Violence: A View From the Bench, 6 MD. J. CoNTEMP. L.

IssuEs 37 (1995).
216. Id.at 39.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.at41.
220. Id.
221.

These very helpful resources, see SACK supra note 59 and CARTER supra note 14,

along with the Model Code, see supra note 99, are available through the Wyoming Coalition
Against Domestic Violence, 409 South Fourth Street, Laramie, WY 82070, (307) 755-5481,
or from the University of Wyoming Domestic Violence Legal Assistance Project, 217 South
First Street, Suite 3, Laramie, WY 82070, (307) 721-5815.
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violence cases, especially the real possibility the victim will recant.m Additionally, the victim is often hysterical when police arrive, during which time
the batterer may accuse the victim of battery.22 a This may often lead to police either not knowing how to handle the victim, or lead them to believe the
victim is not the victim at all, but is a "mutual combatant." Police need to
recognize this and act accordingly. Proper investigation may lead to a finding that the victim was acting in self-defense. The model code addresses this
in its definition of abuse by excluding acts of self-defense from the definition of domestic violence.22 4 Although Wyoming's former definition arguably excluded acts of self-defense from acts of domestic abuse,225 Wyoming
has now adopted the model code definition that specifically excludes acts of
self-defense.2 26 The important point to remember is that law enforcement
needs to be aware to look for acts of self-defense, rather than concluding the
situation to which they responded was "mutual combat."
2. Liability for not Enforcing DVPOs
"[P]rotection orders must be enforced to be effective." 227 In Wyoming, peace officers are those who enforce the laws of the state. 8 Thus,
they are the ones who primarily enforce DVPOs. Wyoming allows victims
of domestic violence to seek emergency assistance from law enforcement
officers." 9 A law enforcement officer then takes whatever steps are necessary to protect the victim from further acts of domestic violence.' 0 A law
enforcement officer is shielded from liability when he responds to a request
222.
Casey Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role ofPolice Officer and
Prosecutor,20 W. ST. U. L. REv. 289, 300-03 (1993).
223.
Id.
224.
See Model Code supra note 99, § 102(1) (defining "Domestic or family violence" as
"one or more of the following acts by a family or household member, but does not include
acts of self-defense").
225.
Because of the language of the statute, some judges felt that any physical contact
against another, even a victim against an abuser, warrants the issuance of a DVPO against the
person who caused the contact. WYO.STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2002)
defined domestic abuse as "physical abuse, threats of physical abuse or acts which unreasonably restrain the personal liberty of any household member by any other household member." Abuse is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as: "A departure from legal or reasonable
use." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 10 (7th ed. 1999). To abuse means to "depart from legal or
reasonable use in dealing with a person or thing." Id. Abusive is defined as "wrongful or
improper use." Id. Webster's defines abuse as: "improper or excessive use or treatment."
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

5 (10th ed. 1996). Therefore, acts of self-defense, by

definition, are not abuse or abusive because they are neither unreasonable nor illegal. Wyoming recognizes a person's right to defend themselves against an attack from another; thus,
self-defense did not fit into any of the categories of "abuse" in the Wyoming statute before
the definition was changed.
226.
WYO.STAT. ANN. § 35-21-102(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003).
227.
JORDAN, supra note 15, at 7.
228.
See Wyo. STAT. ANN.§ 7-2-101(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2003).
229.
WYO.STAT. ANN. § 35-21-107(a) (LexisNexis 2003).

230.

WYO. STAT. ANN.§

35-21-107(b) (LexisNexis 2003).
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for help from a victim of domestic violence.2"' This immunity from liability
would also appear to extend to officers who seek to enforce the provisions of
a protective order. However, when an officer fails to enforce an order of
protection, he risks liability in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 1983.232 Not
only does he risk suit for a procedural due process violation, but he also risks
grave consequence to human life.233 County attorneys, county governments,
law enforcement officials, and the state legislature need to be aware that if a
law enforcement agency fails to enforce a DVPO issued by a court, they may
subject themselves to liability in federal court as in Gonzales.
D.

Practitionersin Wyoming - A Real Life Example

To illustrate the need to make the above referenced changes in
Wyoming, a real-life example of a victim of domestic violence in Wyoming
is described below. The names of those involved are not disclosed, nor the
location in Wyoming revealed to protect the victim. This example encompasses virtually every problem discussed thus far.
In 1998, a woman who would later become a client of the University
of Wyoming Domestic Violence Legal Assistance Project (UWDV) was
going through a divorce. Her troubles began when her ex-husband hired an
attorney whom she thought represented both of them. A divorce decree was
drafted and signed, which included a child custody and visitation agreement.
Immediately she had concerns about the custody arrangement, but was told
by her ex-husband that the agreement's terms were necessary in order to
keep the children on his insurance. She went ahead and signed the agreement. The husband began using the children to control her. She could
spend more time with the children if she lived with him. When she decided
231.
232.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-107(c) (LexisNexis 2003).
See John Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. &

CRIMINOLOGY

46, 53-60 (1992).

233. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2002). In Gonzales,
the police department refused to enforce a protection order obtained by Jessica Gonzales
against her ex-husband. Contrary to the order, Mr. Gonzales took his three children sometime
between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. Mrs. Gonzales called the police several times between 7:30 p.m.
and 12:00 a.m. Mrs. Gonzales had reached Mr. Gonzales on his cell phone at approximately
8:30 p.m. and learned he had the children at Elich Gardens, an amusement park in Denver.
Mrs. Gonzales phoned the police to alert them as to the whereabouts of her ex-husband, but
they still refused to enforce the protection order. Mrs. Gonzales also went to Mr. Gonzales'
apartment around 12:00 am., but he was not there. The last time she called the police, it was
to report to them that she was at her ex-husband's apartment. The dispatcher told Mrs. Gonzales they would send police, but after waiting for the police to show for approximately 50
minutes, she drove to the police station. An officer took a report, but never tried to enforce
the protection order. At approximately 3:20 am., Mr. Gonzales showed up at the police
station, got out of his truck, and began to fire a semi-automatic handgun at the police station.
The officers shot and killed Mr. Gonzales, and found the three children in the cab of the truck,
murdered. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel held that Mrs. Gonzales could bring a
suit for a procedural due process violation under § 1983 for failing to enforce the protection
order. Id.
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this arrangement did not work, she moved out. Things got worse when she
started dating a new boyfriend for the first time since the divorce. Her exhusband did not like her seeing another man, so he would not allow her to
take the children for visitation, and would show up at her house unannounced and would refuse to leave.
Twice in one month, there were two very serious incidents of abuse.
The first time he assaulted and raped her, the second time he assaulted her
and attempted to rape her before she got away. The second incident actually
stopped because the children came in the room. He pled guilty to the first
incident, and is currently awaiting trial on the second.234 After these incidents, she petitioned the court for an order of protection. It was granted.
Nevertheless, even while he was awaiting trial on the second offense, the
protection order was set to expire.235 She petitioned for an extension, but
before he could be served the order expired. She petitioned the court for a
new order of protection, which was also granted. This order stated that the
visitation provisions within the original agreement were to be followed.
This is where the majority of problems begin. Up to this point, the protection order statute had been fairly effective. Aside from the fact that the duration of the order was only three months, and therefore not long enough,
things have generally worked effectively. Even though the DVPO ordered
him to follow the visitation set forth in the agreement, he continued to refuse
to let her have her scheduled visitation. This became especially objectionable when she was supposed to have two months summer visitation, but he
was denying her any visitation at all.
About this time is when she sought help from the UWDV. The first
thing UWDV did was to file a motion to enforce the DVPO with the court.
A hearing took place in front of the judge that had issued the second protection order.u 6 At the hearing, the ex-husband made some unsupported allegations concerning the client's fitness as a mother. Rather than rule on the
motion before the court, the judge decided to do otherwise: First, the judge
decided, on his own, to appoint a guardianad litem for the children; second,
the judge dissolved the protection order because there were similar protections given to the client in the ex-husband's bond order; third, the court
234.
He was charged with violating Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-501 (a) (LexisNexis 2003),
simple assault, the first time, and for violating WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-501(e) (LexisNexis
2003), simple assault on a household member, the second time. How beating and raping a
person constitutes a simple assault, however, is a topic for another day.
235.
He is currently awaiting trial on the second offense now because the prosecutor had
not charged the enhanced offense the first time, and had to dismiss and recharge.
236.
This case has some interesting jurisdictional issues. Although it is the same judicial
district, the divorce was entered in a separate county than the county where the DVPO was
issued. The judge that was involved with the divorce, and had issued the one of the two
DVPOs, assigned, on its own motion, both cases (the divorce and the DVPO) to the judge
handling the current DVPO. This, obviously, was only possible because the judicial district
did not have a circuit court.
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modified the visitation schedule from the original decree; and fourth, the
court ordered the children to be interviewed by DFS.
The mother then had to wait for another two months before the court
held another hearing. The mother had just been denied her entire summer
visitation, not to mention visitation during the two months she was waiting
for another hearing, and lost the order of protection she had been given just a
month earlier, all at a hearing to enforce the protection order. The day of the
hearing, we (including the GuardianAd Litem and the ex-husband's attorney) were talking before the hearing began. Amazingly, the Guardian Ad
Litem made the comment that the ex-husband's conviction and his current
impending trial played no part in his recommendation concerning visitation
because it had nothing to do with what kind of father he was to the children.
At the hearing, the judge then announced that the hearing's purpose was to
"modify visitation," without any notice or petition from either of the parties.
At the hearing, the GuardianAd Litem was allowed to testify with no crossexamination and make his "recommendations" to the judge. The allegations
were indeed "unfounded" so the judge reverted to the original visitation
agreement finding that there was no substantial change in circumstances
(despite the conviction, the impending trial, and the fact that no petition to
modify the decree was pending).
At a subsequent proceeding involving child support issues, we reminded the judge of the previous summer's complete denial of visitation;
thus, the judge warned the ex-husband to make sure the impending summer
visitation took place as ordered - mom had the children for two months. Just
before summer visitation was to take place, the ex-husband packed up the
children and moved them to another state. The ex then refused to allow the
mother the visitation ordered by the court. Again, another entire summer
passed without the mother receiving the visitation to which she was entitled.
Aside from the problem that the protection order would not have expired so early if the duration was closer to every other states' DVPO duration, there are several problems with this case that would be resolved should
the recommendations of this paper be adopted. First, the court should be
given the power to temporarily modify custody and visitation in an order of
protection even where there is a previous custody order in place. Additionally, a court should be requiredto consider domestic abuse as contrary to the
best interests of the children and award custody to the victim." 7 Second, the
court in this case did not follow the statute. The court modified visitation in
a DVPO proceeding, modifying visitation on its own initiative, without a
petition from either party, or a finding of a substantial change in circum-

See supra notes 71-77, 156-58 and accompanying text. The court must consider the
237.
fact that abuse, even of an ex-spouse, is contrary to the best interests of the children.
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stances.238 Third, the court dissolved the DVPO because it found that the exhusband's bond provisions provided similar protections and the DVPO was
thus duplicative. Not only did the judge dissolve the DVPO without giving
the victim a chance to respond, the judge removed the threat of a criminal
violation for violating the DVPO. Furthermore, the ex-husband could enter
into a plea bargain with the prosecutor at any time and she would be left
with no protection.239
This emphasizes the point that judges need to be trained in the area
of domestic violence. 240 This judge appeared to be unfamiliar with the statute and its requirements, and appeared to be unfamiliar with the dynamics of
domestic violence and the impact of domestic violence on children. It was
also clear that neither the judge nor the GuardianAd Litem, the one person

who is supposed to be representing the best interests of the children, thought
that the fact that the ex-husband abused his ex-wife, the mother of their children, was relevant to custody and visitation even though the children were
fully aware of the violence.24 ' The unfortunate thing about this case is that if
the original attorney in the divorce proceeding had made clear that he represented the husband only, this whole scenario may never have taken place.242
IV. THE NEED FOR REPRESENTATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
Many victims of domestic violence must seek orders of protection
without the assistance of counsel.243 From my own experiences and from
talking with others about their experiences, it is clear that victims of domestic violence need representation. 2 " In fact, the single strongest predictor of
whether a woman will return to court to seek assistance from domestic vio238. A court may not modify visitation or custody in a DVPO proceeding. See supra notes
143-44 and accompanying text.
239. For those of you who think that she would be informed before any plea arrangement
was entered, you are incorrect. The last plea arrangement was made without her ever knowing about it.
240. See supranotes 211-21 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of domestic
violence on children). If you also recall, the second instance of abuse was actually stopped by
the children coming into the room.
242. The Rules of Professional Responsibility do not allow one attorney to represent completely adverse parties, such as in a divorce. Arguably, because the mother's perception was
that the attorney represented her, the original attorney violated the Rules of Professional Responsibility. If the mother had legal counsel and knew that the husband was not telling the
truth with regard to the need for him to have custody to keep the children on his medical
insurance the custody situation could have been reversed; thus, none of these problems would
have occurred.
243. See JORDAN, supra note 15, at 1, 3-4.
244. The Wyoming Coalition Against Domestic Violence has a waiting list of victims that
need representation. The University of Wyoming has just started a program as part of its
legal services clinic to provide legal assistance to victims of domestic violence, and that program has a waiting list. There are also many victims around the state that are not on a list, or
cannot be helped by the UW clinic because they are too far away.
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lence is whether she has an attorney." 5 Victims of domestic violence are in
"direct need of assistance from attorneys in civil protection order proceedings. Women who appear in court with legal representation are much more
likely to receive civil protection orders than those women who appear pro
se, and those orders are much more likely to contain more effective and
complete remedies."'2 Victims of domestic violence need competent attorneys, those who understand the issues and have tools necessary to represent
their special needs.247 Attorneys need to develop the skills necessary to provide safe and effective representation.248 That is the purpose of resources
that are available to attorneys: To help attorneys learn about domestic violence issues and how to address them effectively when dealing with clients.249 If every attorney in the state represented one domestic violence victim pro bono, much fewer victims would go without legal representation.
For a small allotment of time, Wyoming attorneys could make a huge contribution to fighting domestic violence.
V. CONCLUSION

Although victims of domestic violence in Wyoming are somewhat
protected, changes are necessary to adequately protect victims and children
under the Domestic Violence statute. First, the statute allowing an ex parte
order to be in effect for more than seventy-two (72) hours must include a
requirement that good cause be shown, good cause must be defined, and the
statute should limit the extension to no more than ten to fourteen (10-14)
days. This would allow petitioners and respondents an opportunity to retain
counsel and effectively prepare for the hearing, but not infringe on due process rights. Second, the duration of DVPOs needs to be extended to at least
one year to become equivalent to other states. Third, the DVPO statute
should cross reference the child custody, visitation, and support statutes to
create uniform application and focus on the best interests of the child. Additionally, the child custody, visitation, and support issues in DVPOs need to
be issued without prejudice so the District Court can address the issues subsequent to the issuance of a DVPO if requested by either party. Fourth, before and during a hearing, judges need to be given the power to consider the
best interests of the children in a DVPO proceeding, even if there is a previous custody order in effect. Additionally, judges should be required to find
that abuse is contrary to the best interest of the children.
Furthermore, judges in Wyoming need to be trained in the area of
domestic violence so that they understand the issues affecting victims of
Waul, supra note 12, at 67.
See Klein & Orloff, supra note 8, at 812.
247. See JORDAN, supra note 15, at 3.
248.
Id.
See generally id. (containing a complete training manual for attorneys, which includes
249.
additional resources, training, cases, statutes, and sample pleadings).
245.
246.
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domestic violence and the obstacles victims face when trying to protect
themselves. The statute requires a finding, whether expressed or implied,
that an act of domestic violence has occurred before a court can issue a
DVPO. Concerns about concurrent or future criminal proceedings are unnecessary because a criminal defendant is adequately protected from selfincrimination. A defendant can tell the truth or at least tell the same story in
the DVPO proceeding that he does in the criminal proceeding, or he can
choose not to testify in either.
Law enforcement and attorneys also need to be trained in domestic
violence and recognition of self-defense so that victims of domestic violence
are adequately protected. Protection orders are very effective if the "coordinated efforts" approach is utilized. Combining resources can only make
victims of domestic violence more empowered and more protected in Wyoming.
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